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Abstract
The Tobacco Convention was adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2003. Nikogosian and 
Kickbusch examine the five potential impacts of the Tobacco Convention and its Protocol on public health. These 
include the adoption of the Convention would seem to unlock the treaty-making powers of WHO; the impact of 
the Convention in the global health architecture has been phenomenal globally; the Convention has facilitated 
the adoption of further instruments to strengthen its implementation at the national level; the Convention has 
led to the adoption of appropriate legal framework to combat the use of tobacco at the national level and that the 
impact of the Convention would seem to go beyond public health but has also led to the adoption of the Protocol 
to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco. However, the article by Nikogosian and Kickbusch would seem to overlook 
some of the challenges that may militate against the effective implementation of international law, including the 
Tobacco Convention, at the national level.
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The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (the Tobacco Convention or Convention) was adopted in 2003.1 The Tobacco Convention is one of the 
most widely ratified international instruments to date. This 
landmark Convention, which came into force in 2005, has 
since been ratified by about 180 countries with about 160 
signatories.2 It was in response to high mortality and morbidity 
rates associated with smoking across the world. A report has 
shown that an estimated 6 million people die annually as a 
result of tobacco.3 Although the Tobacco Convention is not 
a human rights treaty, its proper implementation will go a 
long way in reducing mortality and morbidity associated 
with smoking and thus promote the enjoyment of the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health. Nikogosian 
and Kickbusch would seem to argue that the adoption of 
the Convention has led to a significant development at the 
international level.4 According to the authors, the impact 
of the Convention cannot be underestimated as it has 
demonstrated how international law may influence public 
health at the national level. 
The authors examine the five potential impacts of the 
Tobacco Convention and its Protocol on public health. 
These include, unlocking the treaty-making powers of World 
Health Organization (WHO); global phenomenal impact of 
the Convention in international public health architecture; 
facilitating the adoption of further instruments to strengthen 
the implementation at the national level; adoption of 
appropriate legal framework to combat the use of tobacco 
at the national level and widely recognised impact of the 
Convention beyond public health to also include the adoption 
of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco. 
This position of the authors has been corroborated by other 
authors. For instance, in their study, Gravety et al examine the 
implementation of the key-demand reduction measures of 
the WHO Framework on Tobacco Control in 126 countries.5 
This comprehensive review shows that between 2007 and 
2014, there was a significant global increase in highest-level 
implementation of all key demand-reduction measures of the 
Tobacco Convention. According to the authors, the proper 
implementation of the reduction-measures aspect of the 
WHO Tobacco Convention is associated with lower smoking 
prevalence with the possibility of future reduction in tobacco 
related mortality and morbidity. This finding is no doubt 
significant and would seem to lend credence to the argument 
of Nikogosian and Kickbusch. It would seem to affirm the 
concerted commitment of the international community to 
curbing the negative impact of smoking in the world. 
However, despite the applaud accorded the Convention by 
the authors, there are few issues for consideration. First, the 
application of international law at the national level remains 
a subject of controversy. While attempts have been made by 
some countries to implement the Tobacco Convention at 
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the national level, the degree of success differs. This may be 
attributed to the differences in socio-economic developments 
of the countries. Effective implementation of the Convention 
at the national level requires resources and capacity on the 
part of states. Given the uneven development between rich 
and poor countries, the degree of implementation is bound to 
differ. The report of the Expert Group to assess the impact of 
the Tobacco Convention at the national level has noted that 
the implementation of the Convention at the national level 
has occurred with varied degree of success.6 It should be noted 
that the application of the Convention at the national level, 
like all other international treaties, will depend on the legal 
system of a country. While in some countries it may apply 
directly (monism), in others it may require further actions 
from the legislature before it can apply (dualism).7 
Second, while there is good reason to celebrate the positive 
efforts made so far by states to implement the Tobacco 
Convention at the national level through adoption of laws 
and policies, there is need for caution about the effectiveness 
of these measures. Undoubtedly, adopting laws and policies 
as required by an international instrument is laudable, 
however, this is not a guarantee that those laws and policies 
will be effectively implemented. There is great need for states 
to exhibit good political will at the national level for the 
implementation of provisions of the Convention. Experience 
has shown that even when favourable legal frameworks exist 
at the national level to address a specific issue, states tend to 
fare poorly regarding proper implementation of. In Minister 
of Health v Treatment Action Campaign,8 a group of civil 
society organisations led by the Treatment Action Campaign 
challenged the South African government’s antiretroviral 
treatment programme, which limited access to life-saving 
medication to prevent- mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
to few centres on the basis of a lack of resources and concerns 
about the efficacy of the medicines. The Court held that 
the government’s action was unreasonable and amounted 
to a violation of its obligations under the Constitution and 
international law to realise the right to health. While this case 
deals with realising the right to health at the national level, it 
nonetheless, exemplifies that the existence of a favourable legal 
framework is no guarantee for effective implementation at the 
national level. Thus, there is need for constant monitoring of 
steps and measures adopted by states to effectively implement 
the Convention at the national level. 
Third, the ink of commentators is not dried regarding the 
weakness of the enforcement mechanisms of international law. 
Chapman has argued that the Achilles’ heels of international 
human rights system is the inability to ensure its enforcement 
against erring states.9 Given that states are the primary subject 
of international law; it is always a challenge to devise a means 
of dealing with states that fall short of their obligations under 
ratified treaties. Thus, treaty monitoring bodies or other 
mechanisms established to ensure implementation of a treaty 
often lack the wherewithal to compel states to fulfil their 
obligations when found wanting. At best, what is open to these 
bodies is to ‘name and shame’ a state that has failed to live up 
to its obligations to respect, protect and fulfil rights. Although 
the Tobacco Convention is not a human rights treaty, it is an 
international instrument and as such is not immune from this 
challenge. In essence, there is no assurance that states that fail 
to fully comply with the provisions of the Convention will be 
sanctioned or caused to toe the line. 
Perhaps one of the major concerns regarding the Tobacco 
Convention relates to the monitoring mechanisms under 
article 21. By virtue of this provision, a Conference of Parties 
(COP), made of member states to the Convention, will oversee 
its implementation at the national level.  A state is required 
to submit its initial report 2 years after ratification of the 
treaty. Thereafter, the Conference of Parties will determine 
the periodicity of reports to be submitted by states. The COP 
plays a key role in monitoring the implementation of the 
Tobacco Convention. These include, developing guidelines, 
negotiating Protocols, requesting preparation of technical 
reports and recommendations, mobilising financial resources 
and mechanisms of assistance. It has the responsibility of 
regularly reviewing implementation of the Convention 
and taking decisions necessary to promote effective 
implementation, as well as enabling Parties to understand 
and learn from each other’s experiences.10 Since the COP is 
made of states parties to the Convention, it is paradoxical 
calling on duty-bearers under the Convention to assume the 
supervisory role of ensuring the implementation of the same 
instrument. It is like asking a person to become a judge in his/
her own cause. This is contrary to the well-known principle 
of natural justice that no person should be made to be a judge 
in his/her own cause-nemo judex in causa sua. 
One of the challenges with states reports to treaty monitoring 
bodies is that states are often unfaithful in fulfilling their 
reporting obligations. This makes it difficult for treaty 
monitoring bodies to assess the extent to which states have 
complied with their obligations under a specific treaty. Indeed, 
evidence from member states of the Tobacco Convention 
shows some inconsistencies in reporting status. For instance, 
while South Africa has submitted five reports since ratifying 
the Convention in 2006, Fiji, which ratified in 2003 and Chad 
in 2006 have submitted three and two reports respectively. 
This may tend to undermine the monitoring role of the COP. 
Another major gap not peculiar to the Tobacco Convention is 
the inability to clearly provide for means of holding tobacco 
companies accountable in implementing the provisions of the 
Convention. Like most international instruments, the Tobacco 
Convention is binding on states, which are expected to 
monitor the activities of tobacco companies that are not parties 
to the Convention. This has always led to a serious challenge 
under international law. Indeed, one of the major set-backs 
of international human rights is its inability to hold non-state 
actors accountable for human rights violations.9 While article 
5(3) of the Tobacco Convention provides that states should 
ensure that the tobacco industry does not interfere with the 
implementation of the Convention at the national level, there 
is no clear means of realising this. Therefore, this remains an 
arduous task for developing countries to achieve. Experience 
has shown that multinational companies, including tobacco 
companies, exert great power and influence at the national 
level and are sometimes difficult to ‘tame’ by the host 
countries. This may be true of poor countries, where tobacco 
companies operate, creating employment for a large number 
of the population and contributing greatly to the income of 
the host country. In such situations, it may be impracticable 
for some host countries to fully exercise the nature and 
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degree of control over tobacco companies as envisaged by 
the Convention. A report by the Expert Group to assess the 
impact of the Tobacco Convention at the national level shows 
that the ‘Tobacco industry continues in many ways to resist 
the FCTC and its Articles, and to oppose, undermine and 
delay implementation of all measures that may reduce its sales 
and promotional activities.’6 According to the report, this is 
done through the following means: (i) Use of third party or 
front groups and ‘socially responsible’ activities, (ii) Litigation 
and other legal measure to oppose and delay evidence-
based measures, (iii) Use of international trade and related 
agreements to oppose regulatory measure, and (iv) Efforts to 
present the industry as a partner, particularly through new 
product strategies.7 The report therefore recommends for a 
‘strong, coordinated and transparent’ application of article 5 
(3). 
Recent developments have shown that more concerted efforts 
are being made by the international community to hold 
non-state actors accountable for human rights violations. 
The adoption by the Human Right Council of the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights11 and guidelines to 
ensure corporate responsibility on the part of pharmaceutical 
companies are just few of these initiatives.12 As part of these 
initiatives, non-state actors are expected to exhibit high degree 
of corporate responsibility within the host country. Moreover, 
non-state actors are expected to conduct themselves in such 
a way that their actions or omissions will not lead to harm in 
the host country.12 For tobacco companies, this would imply 
that they are to ensure that their activities will not constitute 
harm to the host country. It is hoped that these initiatives will 
lead to a situation where non-state actors will become more 
accountable to respecting, protecting and fulfilling of human 
rights. 
Conclusion
The Tobacco Convention is undoubtedly a landmark 
development of the 21st century. Apart from being the first 
WHO-led initiative that culminated in a binding instrument, 
the speed at which it came into force and the high number 
of ratifications point to the importance of this instrument. 
Moreover, since its entry into force, the world has witnessed 
more determined and committed efforts on the part of 
states to ensure implementation of the provisions of the 
Tobacco Convention. Much as these developments should be 
commended, we should not be deluded about the challenges 
that may hinder the effective implementation of the 
Convention at the national level. Moreover, the Convention 
like all international instruments is not insulated from the 
controversies and challenges that often make the application 
of international law difficult at the national level.
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